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SECTION 1

MAXIM LIVINOFF: SOVIET RUSSIA'S BEST DIPLOMAT COMES BACK FROM OBSCURITY

by Juan Piedra

At the most crucial moment in the history of Soviet Russia, Premier Stalin has lifted Maxim Litvinoff from almost total oblivion and appointed him to the most important diplomatic post in the world today—Ambassador to the United States.

The appointment may serve to reassure both the United States and Britain that Stalin is determined to fight on against Hitler to the end. The selection of the former Soviet foreign commissar should have a marked effect on the two democratic nations, for the name Litvinoff has been, both in the Soviet Union and the world outside it, a symbol of international cooperation against aggression. From the day that he became foreign commissar, in 1930, to May 4, 1939, when his retirement was announced to an astounded world in a four-line dispatch by Tass, the Soviet news agency, all his talent, energy, and acumen were dedicated to the advocacy of disarmament, collective security, economic cooperation, and international unity.

His downfall foreshadowed that baneful change in Soviet policy of which the bitter fruit was the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 23, 1939, which Stalin characterized "as a date of great historical importance" and as a "turning point in the history of Europe and not only of Europe." Under Litvinov's guidance Soviet policy was forthright, forceful, unequivocal. After the Nazi-Soviet pact it became, in the apt words of the British Prime Minister, "a riddle wrapped in an enigma."

Upon the shoulders of the pudgy, beaming, good-humored former foreign commissar will rest the burden of restoring Soviet diplomatic prestige to the peerless position it occupied in the world of nations until the day of his deposition. To that complex assignment he is sure to bring all his innate shrewdness, fortified by a many-sided experience, gained in a long and colorful career, which few diplomats can match.

Maxim Litvinov was born on July 17, 1876, as Maier Enoch

Wannach, in the province city Belostok, in Russian Poland, to a middle-class family of moderate means. His father was an office worker, without any radical inclinations, but his frequent visits abroad incurred the suspicion of the police. His home was searched, and he spent six weeks in jail and was subsequently under police surveillance. Maxim never forgot the visit he paid his father in jail as a child.

Maxim received a good education in a local high school where he exhibited particular interest in geography and history. At the age of 18 he joined the army as a volunteer. While in the Tsar's service he acquired a deep interest in socialistic theories and revolutionary practice which deepened in a determination to make the promotion of revolutionary propaganda and activity his life-work. From that point on his life-story followed the pattern of all professional revolutionaries. Like Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and scores of other professional revolutionaries, dead and



MAXIM LITVINOFF

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yet living, his knowledge, too, of toil and its attendant miseries was secondhand. That may be one reason why toil to the revolutionaries is associated with sordidness and physical and mental agony.

He began his revolutionary activity in the city of Klinetz, in the Province of Chernigov, in 1898, the year of the birth of the Russian Social Democratic Party. Aware that the secret police were on his trail, he escaped to Kiev in 1899, and there became a member of the executive committee of the revolutionary organization. Betrayed in 1901 by a provocateur—a universal affliction among Russian revolutionary groups—he and his associates were sentenced to a five-year prison term in Siberia, but like many before him, after 18 months of prison life, he eluded his guards and escaped to Switzerland. There he made the acquaintance of Lenin, and joined the latter's extreme revolutionary group known as Bolsheviks after the split of the Second Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Party, in 1903.

Lenin, who would tolerate only subordinates, even as Stalin after him, sensed in Litvinov a helpful and loyal coworker endowed with strong practical sense, but with small proclivities to theorizing, in which domain Lenin considered himself supreme and unquestioned master. Lenin, customarily cold and aloof, regarded Litvinov with especial fondness. He wrote him warm comradely letters, addressing him as "Papasha" (dear father), which is one of Litvinov's pseudonyms and party names; others were Luvine, Felix, Nitz, Graf, Buchmann, Finkelstein. In truth, Litvinov's contribution to Communist theory is nil, although he did write articles in revolutionary papers. It is his practical sense, his ability to get things done, that appealed to Lenin. Litvinov was therefore assigned by the party's leaders practical tasks such as smuggling arms into

Russia and organizing party branches favorable to the Bolshevik ideology.

Litvinov made frequent trips to Russia under a variety of assumed names, apparently unmolested by the dreaded Tsarist secret police, whose efficiency is thereby rendered questionable, which indeed it was. In 1903 he was appointed by the central committee of the Social Democratic Party to be in complete charge of the revolutionary activity in northwestern Russia, with headquarters in Riga, and in this capacity he journeyed back and forth executing various tasks, largely those of smuggling arms into Russia, in which line of enterprise he acquired an uncanny skill.

In the fall of 1905, during the "liberal" period, he established with the aid of Maxim Gorki, who obtained the funds for this purpose from a millionaire friend, the first legal Socialist newspaper, New Life, in which he wrote under the pseudonym Ludwig Nitz. When the governmental reaction set in, he betook himself abroad.

While in the Caucasus smuggling arms he met for the first time his future master, Joseph Stalin-Zhugashvili, then known by the party name Koba, who operated in that area.

In June, 1906, the famous Kamo affair took place, in which comrades Koba and Kamo were the principal actors, but apparently with the astute and expert advice of Maxim Litvinov. Kamo was the name given by Stalin-Koba to an illiterate cutthroat Armenian, a typical mountain brigand, so celebrated in Caucasian lore, whose real name was Ter-Petrosian. The firm of Koba and Kamo specialized in plunder and robbery, especially of ready cash, for the Party's uses. In the jargon of the revolutionaries these attacks on wealthy individuals and banks were euphoniously known as "expropriations," and its perpetrators as "Exes." These acts of violence involving much blood-

shed, were sanctioned by the highest authorities of the Party. To replenish the Party's empty coffers, comrades Koba and Kamo held up on June 13, 1907, a money convoy in the city of Tiflis, with happy results for the Party's treasury. Koba-Stalin threw the bomb which killed members of the convoy, and Kamo snatched the money bags. The yield consisted of 341,000 rubles in 500-ruble notes numbered consecutively. Stalin, the "legendary Caucasian," as Lenin once called him, once proudly boasted of this and similar exploits. Since his rise to power, no mention of this and similar incidents involving Stalin may be made anywhere in Russia.

Since the serial numbers of the banknotes were known and had been dispatched to all banks, Maxim Litvinov and Leonard Krasin conceived of a scheme whereby new numbers were successfully grafted upon the loot. Part of the loot, in the shape of brand-new notes, was assigned to Litvinov, who assumed, first, that two years is a long enough period to forgive and forget, and, second, that no foreign banks would be apprised of the serial numbers. He was dead wrong. When he decided to give the rubles currency a sharp-eyed French bank teller communicated with the police, and he would soon have found himself in the clutches of the Tsar's police had the French authorities acceded to the demands for extradition. He was permitted instead to repair to London, where he remained till the end of 1918.

While in England he engaged in journalism, was a draftsman in architects' offices, a salesman and a teacher. He kept his contacts with the Russian revolutionary leaders, particularly with Lenin.

In 1916 he married Ivy Low, daughter of a well-known barrister, and the niece of Sir Maurice Low, a noted British correspondent and journalist. Madame Litvinov is a skilled musician and a writer of fiction. She has taught basic English in Soviet

schools/ They have two children, a son and a daughter.

The outbreak of the revolution in Russia, and especially the victory of the Soviets, filled Litvinov's heart with rejoicing. In January, 1918, the first Soviet foreign commissar Trotski cabled him his designation as Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain. The British government, indignant at the Bolshevik betrayal of the war effort, refused to recognize the new plenipotentiary.

Litvinov had meanwhile been propagating in favor of the Bolshevik revolution. He wrote a pamphlet in which he hailed the "dictatorship of the proletariat," of whose permanence he was not then wholly convinced. The British authorities placed him under arrest and would not permit him to leave until the British secret service agent, Bruce Lockhart, was released by the Soviets. Soon afterwards the exchange took place. He spent ten months in British jails.

From the day he returned to Russia, at the end of 1918, to the day of his retirement, in May, 1939, he was wholly associated with diplomatic activity. He was by turns assistant foreign commissar, envoy to a number of European States, almost consistently a member, and often the head, of the Soviet delegations to all international conferences. Upon him fell the onerous duty of effecting peaceful relations with the neighboring Baltic states, which were the jumping off ground for invasions of Soviet territory. One of his first diplomatic acts was a message to President Wilson on Christmas Day, 1918, asking his aid in the removal of the economic blockade, which was strangulating the new state.

In 1930 Litvinov was appointed foreign commissar, replacing the aristocratic Chicherin, whose health was ruined by overwork. On all accounts he was ideally equipped for the post of foreign commissar. His knowledge of the world, and especially western

Europe, was first-hand and thorough.

Litvinov's policy in the conduct of foreign policy was simple to the point of naivete. The policy was conditioned primarily by the needs of the Soviet state. Russia needed peace to recover from the wounds of the civil war. When Stalin resolved upon industrialization, a long period of peace and economic cooperation for a successful accomplishment of the various five-year plans was indispensable. From the day of his appearance on the diplomatic arena he urged "immediate, complete and general disarmament." He meant total and not partial disarmament. He contended that partial disarmament has proved "Utopian," why not try total disarmament and see "whether what has seemed Utopia will not prove feasible?"

With the rise of nazism he began to advocate collective security and mutual nonaggression pacts. From the tribune of the League of Nations he untiringly invoked his favorite theories of collective security, because he sensed that Russia would be the victim of fascist aggression.

"Fascism," he declared, "directs its fiery arrows particularly against the Soviet State, ostensibly because the ideas of communism are professed there, but in reality because it is the object of the predatory aims of fascism, and also an obstacle to its aims of conquest in other directions."

His very bluntness and directness served to heighten the world's admiration for the Soviet spokesman. His utterances were eagerly received everywhere. Stalin's regard for his foreign commissar was equally high.

In July, 1936, Litvinov was accorded, on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, the Order of Lenin, the highest distinction within the gift of the Soviet Union. Stalin and Molotoff sent him a congratulatory letter praising him as "one of the oldest active members of the Bolshevik

Party, guide of Soviet diplomacy, tireless fighter against war and for the cause of peace in the interest of all toilers." Litvinov, in his turn, referred to Stalin, in his infrequent public speeches before Soviet audiences, as the "great, glorious leader"—which, in view of the adulations showered upon Stalin, was tepid praise indeed—and lauded the destruction of the "Trotskyist-Fascist aggregation of spies and wreckers in embryo."

Munich marked not only the collapse of Litvinov's foreign policy, but was Litvinov's personal Munich as well. Prophetically he announced to assembled journalists on March 17, 1938: "Tomorrow might be too late, but today there is time yet, if all States, particularly great States, take up a firm unambiguous standpoint on the problem of the collective salvation of peace." Although his removal from office and relegation to obscurity came in May, 1939, Munich foreshadowed the coming event. Stalin's mind, for all its cunning, is slow moving. Ideas and designs ripen slowly in his inscrutable brain. At the end of April Litvinov still negotiated with foreign envoys, including the British Ambassador. On May 1 he watched the May Day parade in the company of Stalin. On May 4 came the brief announcement of his resignation from the post of foreign commissar. The resignation was attributed to the foreign commissar's own request, owing to ill health. On May 6 his portrait was removed from the office of the commissariat. He was observed in July at a session of the Supreme Soviet, to which body he was a duly elected delegate, was publicly shunned, and then he dropped out of sight. On July 26, 1939 Molotoff rebuked Litvinov publicly for his antagonistic policy to the Fascist states. His eclipse—if not worse—appeared total.

Today as in 1918, it is Litvinov's lot to rehabilitate in effect Soviet foreign policy, and endow it again with that prestige which it enjoyed under his guidance.

PHILADELPHIA, April 10.

Following is the text of the address of Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff tonight before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at the Benjamin Franklin Hotel:

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I should like to begin by saying how greatly I feel the privilege of being able to address your Academy. I have been formally associated with it for many years now, and have always followed its publications from afar with the deepest interest. It was with special satisfaction that I accepted the proposal to speak on a theme so near to my heart as "United Efforts."

For institutions like your Academy, devoted to the study of political and economic sciences, there is still one problem which has not been studied, in all its intricacy, namely, the question of how it happened that governments, peoples and the scientific societies concerned, could, for a period of six years, look on calmly and indifferently at the birth and development of the theory of Hitlerism, poisoning as it has the whole of international life, spreading anguish, death and destruction, at first in its native land, then in the countries nearest, and finally throughout all continents, the whole world. I say "all continents" because everyone must now realize that what is at present going on in the Pacific stems from that same Hitlerism which has brought to life all the potential forces of aggression.

It is this question which will perplex the historian of the future. The question how it was that statesmen, responsible popular leaders, governments, knowing the program of Hitlerism, its aims and the means by which these aims were to be achieved, knowing that the realization of this program would mean the destruction of century-old achievements of the human spirit, of the most important social-political conquests, knowing that it would be equivalent to a return to the middle ages, if not to primeval times, that it would spell the end of the independence of most states, the enslavement, in the literal sense of the word, of whole nations, yet did nothing to prepare for self-defense, nothing for the unification of the efforts of those marked out as victims of Nazi aggression. I am convinced that the study of this question will throw fresh light on the whole structure of modern society.



MAXIM LITVINOFF

without independence, have come back to political life.

Everything is different in this world war, in which, with the exception of the so-called Axis powers, all the other states are waging the struggle for their very existence, in the most literal sense of the word. For them to lose the war would mean not only the diminution of territory, but the complete loss of political and economic independence, the enslavement of their populations, the surrender to an alien and repulsive ideology, the renunciation of all their historical traditions, faith, morals, all their political and social ideals, all that is dear to every nation and every human being brought up in the spirit of modern civilization.

If then, previous wars demanded tremendous efforts, this war, in which everything is at stake, imperatively demands from the countries opposing Hitlerism, the utmost intensity of effort, the utmost sacrifices. In these countries only persons with no conception of patriotism, national honor, conscience, liberty, international solidarity, civilization — persons hoping to get from the conquerors the posts of Quislings — hangers-on, gaolers, oppressors of their own compatriots, persons generally known as the fifth column — can deny the need for such efforts and sacrifices.

I am happy to be able to testify before you that in the country which I have the honor to represent such people cannot get themselves heard or read. The peoples of the Soviet Union fully understood at once what a Hitler victory would mean both for themselves and for other nations, for the whole of humanity, and entered like one man into the struggle against the Hitler hordes. There is no sacrifice too great for the Soviet peoples in this war. All physically fit men have thrown themselves into the fight,

thanks to remarkable will and endurance, to avert my invasion of her islands. We do not forget the bitter experiences of the English people when London and other English towns and ports had to beat off severe bombardments for months on end. We remember the initiative displayed by the British in their daring offensives against the Italian armed forces in Libya, in Ethiopia, in the Red sea region; the generous aid given by Great Britain to Greece; the sacrifices made by her in other arenas of war. We appreciate the material help so loyally rendered, and still being rendered by Great Britain to our Red Army. We are inspired by the example of the heroic Chinese people, steadfastly defending their native land for four years. The whole world has watched with admiration the heroic deeds of General MacArthur and his army. We appreciate the substantial aid which the United States, even before actually entering the war, rendered us, and is rendering us now. The Soviet people learn with sincerest gratitude, of the arrival of ships with military material from the United States. Nor do we forget the efforts of the other United Nations, who have fallen out of the struggle.

But this is not the moment for us to sing each other's praises, or distribute prizes. The only prize worthy of our united efforts can be absolute victory over Hitler and his satellites. But this victory still needs to be organized. So far we are only feeling our way towards it, we have not found the right path yet. It is essential to find this path by our united efforts, and we must be quick about it, or it may be blocked before we get there. For the solution of the problems which confront us we must start from the following axioms:

1. Victory is impossible without the destruction of Hitler;
2. Hitler cannot be destroyed either by blockading Germany or solely by bombarding German towns, but only on the field of battle;
3. The main field of battle lies at present on the territory of the Soviet Union, where the overwhelming majority of the divisions of Germany and of those wrung from her satellites, are concentrated and will continue to be concentrated;
4. The Red Army has shown that these divisions can be beaten, driven back and destroyed;
5. The complete destruction and final defeat of Hitler demands definite united efforts of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, with some supplementary aid from the United States of America.

The task is clear to the layman

Hitler on the only front where this is possible. Victory may be long in coming if one state has to exhaust its major forces in today's military operations, while another harbors them for possible operations at some indefinite time in the future. Our efforts must be united for simultaneous action.

But the infliction of defeat and the attainment of victory cannot be our ultimate aim. United efforts are required also for the final eradication of the Nazi-fascist tree with its poisoned fruits, for the healing of the wounds suffered by humanity in this blood-thirsty war, for the creation on a new basis of future economic and political international relations. It seems to me that the more easily we can achieve united efforts now, all participants in the struggle making about equal sacrifices, the more successful will be our united efforts for the organization of the peace—a true peace—based on unity and conduct.

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liferal sense of the word, of whole nations, yet did nothing to prepare for self-defense, nothing for the unification of the efforts of those marked out as victims of Nazi aggression. I am convinced that the study of this question will throw fresh light on the whole structure of modern society, and furnish fresh standpoints for the study of nationalism, patriotism and the state. But this is not the time for such a study.

I must, however, qualify what I have said: indifference and apathy to Nazism and the dangers which it presents have not been quite universal. There have, of course, been people—journalists, statesmen and even governments, who have understood the ominous significance of Hitlerism. I must single out the government of the Soviet Union which, in the very first stages of the development of Hitlerism, realized the necessity for the united efforts of many countries for the aversion of the catastrophe which Hitler intended to and did bring upon humanity. For many years the Soviet Government called untiringly for collective security, which meant united efforts, at the same time preparing to create a material basis for its own efforts. But in spite of its sincere efforts it became finally convinced of the absence on the part of other governments of any real desire for the organization of a common active front against Hitlerism on the basis of equal rights, and community of efforts and sacrifice. But Hitler had to begin carrying out his program in full before there was any return to the idea of united efforts. And even now I am not quite sure that this idea, what it implies, and what is essential to the determined struggle against the common danger, is adequately realized everywhere.

Any war requires tremendous efforts, but there are wars and wars. We know of past wars, launched for the sake of conquest, in which the instigators sought the expansion of their territory. We know of wars undertaken to remove or weaken a powerful rival. The losing side in such wars, whether the aggressor or the defender, generally speaking, lost provinces or colonies, had to pay for a term of years a greater or smaller sum in contributions to the conqueror, suffered a weakening of its political and economic power, and so on. The history of the last few centuries yields few examples of the losing side surrendering its national independence. Not a single conquered state has disappeared from the map of the world, even after the first World War. On the contrary, the number of independent states has increased, and nations which had long been

victory would mean both for themselves and for other nations, for the whole of humanity, and entered like one man into the struggle against the Hitler hordes. There is no sacrifice too great for the Soviet peoples in this war. All physically fit men have thrown themselves into the fight, and those remaining in the rear, women as well as men, are working unceasingly day and night to supply all that the fighters are in need of. In places overrun by the enemy their inhabitants destroy everything of value, their own property, the accumulation of years, rather than leave it to the despoilers. They destroy constructions on which decades of work and vast capital have been expended, so as to prevent the enemy using them. They have carried to perfection the tactics of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines. They are enduring incredible and privations and discomforts in connection with mass evacuation of the population, and all the other hardships of war. They are ready to make similar and still greater sacrifices in the future, so long as they have any strength left, to drive the foe from their territory, and to ensure the triumph of our common anti-Hitler cause.

But the enemy, too, is very strong. From the moment of his accession to power Hitler imposed a military regime upon his own people, and has been sapping their strength, squeezing their life-blood from them for six years now, in the endeavor to build up a war-machine which should surpass in power the means of defense of the peace-loving countries. Owing to victories over countries which, in 1939 and 1940, defended themselves practically singlehanded against him, he has gained dominance over almost the whole of Europe, between the western frontiers of the Soviet Union and the British Isles. He has got hold of all the industry, all the sources of raw material in the conquered countries and made the whole able-bodied populations of those countries work for him and his war. That is why even the utmost efforts of any single state might prove insufficient to overpower him. The united efforts, efforts really united, of states still capable of continuing the struggle against Hitler, are required, efforts which have not yet, I fear, left the realms of hope.

We do not forget the immense efforts made and still being made by individual countries drawn into the struggle against Hitler. Fresh in our memory are the ordeals undergone by Great Britain in her hardest days, when France caused the world a disappointment at once so unexpected and so tragic, when Great Britain only managed,

that these divisions can be beaten, driven back and destroyed;

5. The complete destruction and final defeat of Hitler demands definite united efforts of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, with some supplementary aid from the United States of America.

The task is clear to the layman, as well as to the professional strategist. Its execution will, of course, entail difficulties and risks, but who ever thought it would be easy or unhazardous to conquer Hitler and the powers of darkness he has called into being? However, I am sure the task will be found feasible the moment those on whom its fulfillment depends realize that it is not a question of someone or other's intriguing theory, to be mulled over at leisure, not a bit of strategical luxury, which may safely be ignored, but a thing essential, imperative, on which depends the possibility, or the impossibility of victory.

Among the multiplicity of fronts along which the United Nations are fighting, there are undoubtedly many on which appreciable victories are not to be expected for a long time to come, and where, moreover, considerable reverses must be regarded as inevitable. This being so, should we not pay special attention to the only front on which united efforts have a good chance of bringing about a great victory, more than compensating for those reverses? This is of the utmost importance not only for the encouragement of the United Nations, and the depressing effect on the morale of the Axis countries, but also for the upsetting of Hitler's schemes to win over to his side the remaining neutral countries.

I do not think, ladies and gentlemen, that any of us desires to perpetuate a situation, in which, whenever we open our newspaper or switch on our radio, we read or hear of fresh vantage points occupied by the enemy, of fresh enemy victories and achievements, of untiring diplomatic activity on the part of the enemy, while we can only guess where the next blow will be dealt—on the northern sector of the Soviet front, or on the southern, in Turkey, Sweden, Spain, Cyprus, or Malta. The very fact that we have such a broad field for our guesses shows how advantageous is the enemy's position, compelling us to scatter our forces. Isn't it time for us to make Hitler rack his brains and wonder where his enemies will direct their next blows, on which part of the continent they will land troops? Isn't it time to compel him to scatter his forces a little? That is what united efforts are needed for, and not united efforts in the abstract, or at some future date. I mean united efforts now, for the definite purpose of inflicting defeat on

Litvinoff Presents Cuban Credentials

Havana, April 7 (AP).—Maxim Litvinoff, Russian Ambassador to the United States, arrived here by plane today to present his credentials to President Fulgencio Batista as the first Soviet minister to Cuba.

With him was Dr. Aurelio Conchoso, Cuban ambassador to Washington, who will go to Moscow as his country's minister in accordance with the recent establishment of relations between the two nations. Both Litvinoff and Conchoso will have dual capacities, remaining as ambassadors to Washington.

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Coffey.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Carson.....
Mr. Hendon.....
Mr. McGuire.....
Mr. Mumford.....
Mr. Piper.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....

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THE WASHINGTON POST
MORNING EDITION

Date APR 8 1943

What Is the Press Up to?

There's a lot of big talk about "freedom of the press." Yet, this country witnessed this week one of the most shameful "censorships" ever to take place: the complete blackout of news on Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff's speech in Havana, Cuba.

Litvinoff, after all, is not only the ambassador of a great power, our ally, but he is one of his country's foremost statesmen, a former commissar for foreign affairs. One of the world's great statesmen, in fact.

Yet no important newspaper in the country carried the text of his speech, even after it was reprinted in the official information bulletin of the Soviet embassy in Washington, which is where we got the text.

What's the matter with our free press? Don't they recognize news when they see it?

Or is there a campaign on to snub the Soviet ambassador? To keep the American public in ignorance of the Soviet viewpoint on the course of the war.

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THE WORKER

Date April 25, 1943
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Miss Gandy	

Stalin's Recall of 2 Envoys Seen as Sign of Displeasure

By HELEN LOMBARD.

Washington diplomatic observers habitually read into Soviet diplomatic moves, more than appears upon the surface.

The news that Ivan Maisky, the U. S. S. R. Ambassador to London, has been ordered back to Moscow to "report" is giving color to the rumors that followed the departure of Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff from Washington.

The temporary removal of these two key Ambassadors is interpreted as a sign of Premier Stalin's active displeasure with the strategy of war as conceived by the United States and Great Britain.

The betting here is that both Mr. Litvinoff and Mr. Maisky will remain in Moscow for some time to come.

The Soviet Embassy in Washington, even when the Ambassador was present, took no active part—outside of an occasional reception—in the social life of Washington.

In London the story is somewhat different. Mr. Maisky was in London while Russia was the ally of Germany. He remained in the British capital during that difficult diplomatic period and stayed on to represent the new policy inaugurated by the British-Soviet alliance.

The British are physically closer to the war than we are and they are apt to be more realistic about diplomatic problems. During the period of great strain, when Moscow and Berlin appeared to be closer, Mr. Maisky was not ostracized in London. On the contrary, there was a definite effort to win the U. S. S. R. Ambassador into the Allied camp.

Mr. Maisky's idiosyncrasies made

him a "character" in London society. The Soviet Ambassador's habit of offering apples and vodka to the British visitors who happen to call at the tea hour was a subject of London anecdotes. Even the most conservative circles in the British capital did not ignore the Soviet envoy. During the most intimate period of Soviet-Nazi collaboration, Mr. Maisky remarked to a foreign diplomat stationed in London "three duchesses have just invited me to dinner, one after the other. The British must be really worried."

The Maiskys became an accepted part of London's social and diplomatic life, but never lost sight of the fact that they represented the foremost revolutionary power in the world.

The wife of a Central European diplomat now stationed in Washington remembers an "at home" which she attended at the Soviet Embassy in London. It occurred shortly after one of the fiercest Nazi air attacks on the British capital. The English women present were commenting on the fact that the German bombers had concentrated on the poorer sections of London in order to stir up class hatred.

Mme. Maisky with a disarming smile remarked: "The Nazis don't know how very difficult it is to start a revolution in England!"

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Diplomat's Progress

MAXIM LITVINOFF. By Arthur Upham Pope. 544 pp. New York: L.B. Fischer. \$3.50.

By WALTER DURANTY

MR. POPE'S long biography of Litvinoff is a remarkable feat of scholarship and research as well as a vivid and interesting picture of a man who has played a singularly important role in world affairs of the last twenty-five years. As one of the earliest "contact men" of the infant Soviet Republic with the Western powers, Litvinoff was at first publicized as a sinister figure operating mysteriously in a semi-conspiratorial manner. It is only in recent years that the world has regarded him as a clear-sighted and responsible statesman whose chief fault—if it be a fault—was a brusque outspokenness rather than duplicity.

It was perhaps unfortunate that Litvinoff's name first was known in the West in connection with his arrest in 1908 (by the French police in Paris) on a charge of possessing and trying to pass ruble notes, part of a large sum that had been "looted" by revolutionaries from the Bank of Tiflis in the previous summer. A hand in the planning of this "expropriation," as the revolutionaries termed it, is said to have been taken by a young Georgian Socialist, Joseph Vissarionovich Djughashvili, later known as Stalin, but the actual seizure of the treasure was carried out by Djughashvili's friend nicknamed Kamu.

It is interesting to note, as Mr. Pope points out, that Litvinoff's release, on the grounds that the alleged crime was clearly political, was ordered by the French Minister of Justice, Aristide Briand, who later cooperated with Litvinoff to bring about what seemed for a moment a genuine possibility of peace in post-war Europe. Nevertheless, this incident permitted a prominent English statesman once to refer to Litvinoff as a "common criminal," and did not facilitate his first attempt to secure British recognition for Soviet Russia.

Mr. Pope shows Litvinoff as a quiet, cheerful, persevering, rather bourgeois individual, a kind husband and father, living a modest, humdrum life in London, which contrasted strangely with the important work he was called upon to do. The author tells a delicious story of Litvinoff's reception, while an exile in London, of the news of the Czar's abdication.

Litvinoff alone in his London apartment because his wife was still in a nursing home with their three-months-old son Misha, awoke one misty morning and began reading his morning paper in bed. The Tsar had abdicated, the Russian revolution had begun. He dashed out of bed into the bathroom, jumped into the tub, leapt out and began to rub himself dry—only to realize that in a veritable trance of excitement he had been "bathing" in an empty tub. He flung on his clothes and got to a telephone by half-past eight.

Madame Litvinoff in the nursing home was awakened at eight by a nurse. When she asked for the papers the nurse brought them but said, "There is hardly anything in them this morning. Another Zeppelin raid over the East End, but it was driven back. All quiet on all fronts, they say." So Madame Litvinoff did not bother with the news. Then came the tele-

phone message from her husband. Tsar abdicated. Provisional government."

Two months after the Soviet Revolution, in December, 1917, Litvinoff was appointed unofficial Soviet "Ambassador" in London, but had small success with the British Government. When, however, the latter decided to send Bruce Lockhart on a special mission to Moscow, a meeting was arranged between Lockhart and Litvinoff. Mr. Pope describes it as follows:

From the beginning of the meeting in Lyon's Restaurant in the Strand, Lockhart and Leeper [Rex Leeper, a brilliant official of the British Foreign Office] made it clear that Soviet Russia would not be recognized, but Litvinoff realized that Lockhart's presence there would be a step in that direction and agreed to give him a letter of introduction to Trotsky, then Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

At the end of the luncheon Litvinoff ordered his dessert, "diplomat pudding," but the

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The New York Times
Maxim Litvinoff.

waitress came back to report there was no more. Smiling ruefully, he murmured, "Not recognized even by Lyon's."

Mr. Pope's book is more concerned with Litvinoff as a statesman than with such entertaining trivia. It has the dramatic integration of Litvinoff's progress from such humble beginnings to the position of an outstanding figure in a chaotic world.


Litvinoff had the unusual faculty of being able to ignore rebuffs and of submerging himself and his feelings in the work that he was doing and the goals at which he aimed. The author describes in full detail Litvinoff's uphill struggle against foreign prejudice at the Geneva Disarmament Conference and other international meetings. His speeches, which are quoted in detail, justify Mr. Pope's admiration.

Litvinoff has played so big a part in world affairs in the period between the two wars that the story of his life must necessarily involve a study of international politics. But Mr. Pope's book does leave a feeling that this wider background somewhat overshadows Litvinoff's life and personality. He has been able to collect so much interesting material about Litvinoff the man, as distinct from Litvinoff the statesman, that one wishes he had written more of the biography and less of the historical treatise. The final chapter gives a masterly analysis of Litvinoff's character and achievements.

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*The story of the man throughout whose life
the idea of PEACE runs like a flame!*



JOSEPH E. DAVIES,
former U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

says: This book gives the unfamiliar account of what, in fact, is an exciting and romantic life. Here appear those forces through the years which combined to temper, refine, and strengthen those qualities of courage, high-mindedness, shrewdness, together with the blunt moral integrity and practical idealism which characterizes Litvinoff. It is fascinating reading.

An interesting feature of the book is the authoritative manner in which the history of Russia in the last 35 years is unfolded. For in this story of Litvinoff's life there is reflected the story of Russia. I know of no available book which would present to the American public anything like it.

It is a good job, well done, and a valuable contribution to an understanding of the Soviet attitude as to the present, as well as to the future. It is indispensable reading for any one who wishes to understand this new phenomenon in historical evolution — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

**MAXIM
LITVINOFF**

by **ARTHUR UPHAM POPE**

544 pages

At all bookstores \$3.50

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Davies*

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Maxim Litvinoff

The voice of Maxim Litvinoff had long since ceased to influence Soviet policy. So the announcement of his death will be received with regret here, not because of any tangible effect it will have on our relations with Russia, but because his passing erases the last visible symbol of that school of Soviet diplomacy which embraced the live-and-let-live philosophy.

Even at the peak of his career, during the decade or more when he headed the Soviet Foreign Office, Mr. Litvinoff was on the fringe rather than at the center of Russian policy-making. Stalin neither liked nor trusted him, and after his removal as Foreign Minister in 1939 Mr. Litvinoff was ushered to the front of the Soviet stage only when he could be used as window dressing for some particular Kremlin purpose.

Still, on the face of the matter at least, this man came close to altering the course of history. In the late thirties, when the shadow of Hitlerism fell across Moscow as well as over the West, Mr. Litvinoff was negotiating with the French and the British for a mutual security pact. Always an advocate of international co-operation against aggressor states, he saw the danger clearly and recognized that only the prospect of war on two fronts might restrain the German dictator. But the negotiations came to nothing. First there was the Munich deal, in which the French and British sold out Czechoslovakia. Then the British insisted on changes in the proposed treaty to limit their commitment to come to Russia's aid in event of attack. Arguments can be made in defense of both of these things, perhaps, but their combined effect on the Soviet Foreign Minister was disastrous. If Stalin had ever believed in the Litvinoff policies, which is doubtful, Munich and the British treaty stand produced a swift change of heart. Mr. Molotov replaced Mr. Litvinoff at the helm of the Foreign Office; the non-aggression pact with the Nazis was concluded, and within a few days the Second World War had begun.

Nothing is more futile than speculation as to what might have been. Still, the possibility remains that an effective mutual security agreement with the West in the late thirties might have tipped the balance in Moscow. Had the internationalist Litvinoff views prevailed instead of the dark nationalism of the Politburo, it is conceivable at least that the threat of another and more terrible war would not today be hanging over the world.

Now that Mr. Litvinoff is dead, there is no hint or sign that any of his work lives on. And yet it seems futile to talk of peace unless at least the substance of his philosophy emerges some day as the basis of Russian foreign policy. So, even though the symbol is gone, the hope must be that intelligence and sanity will assert themselves in Russia, and that in the end it will

be found that Mr. Litvinoff did not live and labor in vain.

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Exemption

Feb 2

'We Russians Can't Be Trusted'

Reds Don't Fear A-War, Litvinov Said

They Belittle
 Bomb's Capacity

By RICHARD C. HOTTELET

*Litvinov, Maxim
 Maximovich*

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TITLE
 SECURITY MATTER

N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM & SUN

JAN 29 1952

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In that summer of 1946—as today—few things seemed as important as the atom bomb. The worries of the world centered around three questions:

1. Will Russia join in a system of real atomic control?
2. Does the Kremlin realize the fearful power of this weapon?
3. Will knowledge and responsibility spare the world an atomic war?

I discussed these questions with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov in his Moscow office June 18:

He said that Russia would not agree to atomic control, that it did not attach undue importance to the bomb and that it would not necessarily be afraid of atomic war.

Control Plan.

His answer to the first question was provoked by my reference to the Baruch Plan. Bernard Baruch had presented to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission the American proposals for rigid control of the atom. The plan aimed to make it impossible for any nation to exploit atomic power for political advantage. It provided for rigid inspections in every country.

Mr. Litvinov made it plain that the Soviet Union would accept nothing sharper than false teeth—better still, no teeth at all.

"Two distinct actions are required by the Baruch Plan," he said. "One is to subscribe to the principle of international control. The second is taking the necessary steps to relinquish sovereignty in this field and actually to permit rigid inspection."

I asked him specifically whether the U.S.S.R. could be expected to go the whole way.

Mr. Litvinov replied tersely that the U.S.S.R. was not likely to submit to inspection.

Fake Control.

The following day, June 19, Andrei Gromyko placed Moscow's counter-proposals before the United Nations. The guts of this plan was "international control," but of a different sort. Mr. Gromyko suggested an international commission under the direction of

This is the second of five articles reporting the most astonishing interview ever given by a top-ranking Russian diplomat. To have published Maxim Litvinov's words while alive probably would have meant his execution. Richard C. Hottelet, the foreign correspondent who got the interview, waited until Mr. Litvinov's death was announced Jan. 2 this year. Now, for the first time, the story is told to the public. Mr. Hottelet gave our State Department a confidential report of the interview shortly after it took place.

the U.N. Security Council, in other words with Russia's veto power able to block any real inspection. It was fake control.

Analysis has always shown that in their proposals everything depends on Soviet Russia's living up to its pledged word.

Mr. Litvinov's warning that Moscow's word is not worth the paper it is written on has strengthened the U.S. government in its demand for genuine guarantees.

Much depends on whether the rulers of Russia really know what atomic power means. It has been shown that Stalin had a wealth of practical knowledge at his disposal at that time. Indications are he does not attach as much importance to the atom bomb as we do.

Red Conservatism.

In the course of my conversation with Mr. Litvinov he mentioned that there had been a return in the Soviet Union to the outmoded concept of security in terms of territory.

I asked him how it was possible that the present leaders, astute and capable men, could cling to the outmoded idea that a river or a mountain range or a thousand kilometers of ground would provide security.

Mr. Litvinov responded: "Because they are conservative in their thinking and still follow old lines."

This conservatism is well known to anyone who has lived in Russia or has close dealings with the Russians.

The information on weapons development provided by the Canadian spies, by Klaus Fuchs and Professor Pontecorvo did not move the Kremlin to press for a workable system of security and control. In fact Russian propaganda portrayed the atom bomb as little more than another Western instrument of blackmail against the Soviet Union.

Mr. Litvinov made it clear that

this approach was not just sour grapes to smooth over Russia's lack of the atom bomb at that time, but a basic underestimate of the bomb's capacity.

No Hint of Scruples.

I put the question to him in this form: "Poison gas was not used in World War II because both sides tacitly agreed it was too terrible a weapon. How do you regard the chances of the atom bomb's not being used in the event of another war?"

Mr. Litvinov answered slowly. "That depends entirely on the attitude of the people who have atomic bombs. If one side thinks it can bring about a quick victory by using them, the temptation will be great.

"Even if both sides are evenly matched, if one side feels that its immense area and manpower, resources and dispersed industry safeguard it to a large extent, it will not be loath to use the bomb. This would be especially true where public opinion has no weight, where the state leadership has been capable of completely conditioning the public mind."

At no point did Mr. Litvinov as much as hint that moral scruple, or a decent regard for human life, or fear of world-wide devastation would alone keep the Kremlin from using the atom bomb.

Mutual Suspicion.

Mr. Litvinov's attitude was one of resignation mixed with disgust and relief that he was not identified with his government's foreign policy.

But the full bitterness and cynicism that must have been in him came to the surface when I asked him whether it might not be true that much of the mutual suspicion between East and West might lie in the difficulty of drawing a line between genuine security and imperialist aggression.



RICHARD C. HOTTELET
Was Fearful of Frame-Up

Deputy Minister Litvinov, the last remaining Jew holding high rank in the Soviet foreign service, regarded me sadly.

"He spoke almost gently, as though to lessen the impact of his words.

"Hitler," he said. "Hitler probably felt sincerely that his demands were justified, that he was entitled to lebensraum. Hitler was probably genuinely convinced that his actions were preventive and forced on him by external circumstances."

Showed No Fear.

Several times during the time I spent in Mr. Litvinov's office I wondered if the man had gone crazy or whether this could be some fantastic frame-up.

I took it for granted that his office was fully wired for sound and that the MGB, the secret police, was recording the whole dialogue.

But if there was any fear of microphones or frameup in Mr. Litvinov's mind, he did not show it. Not even when he almost scared me out of the room by airily considering the prospects of revolution and the consequences of Stalin's death.

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TOMORROW: Mr. Litvinov Discusses the Future of Russia.

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GRAHAM

'We Russians Can't Be Trusted'

Revolt in Soviet? It'd Be

Red Rulers Too Strong, He Noted;
 Predicted Partition in Germany

Third of a Series.
 By RICHARD C. HOTTELET.

Too Hard, Said Litvinov

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During my extraordinary interview with Maxim Litvinov, he dismissed my hope that the world outlook might perhaps not be as bad as he had painted it. His views were positive and emphatic.

In Mr. Litvinov's opinion Stalin's death would not alter the course of Soviet policy. Nor did he seriously consider



Richard Hottelet

the possibility that pressure inside Russia could change the government or its objectives by revolution. There is perhaps no more sensitive subject in Russia than the person of Stalin. His name is seldom mentioned without an attitude that approaches awe. Put bluntly, Stalin is the closest thing to God recognized by the Soviet state.

Name Not Used.

The propaganda machine does not acknowledge that Stalin will one day die. When my conversation with Mr. Litvinov on that hot June day in 1946 turned to the prospects after Stalin's death and the chances of revolution, I began to sweat in earnest.

The august name of Stalin was never mentioned by either of us. Nor did Mr. Litvinov use the words "revolution" and "Russia" in the same sentence. But I was well aware that if the room were wired for sound only a low grade moron would fail to get the point in the first 10 seconds.

The matter of succession came up in this way. Mr. Litvinov had described the outlook as bad, had expressed the opinion that differences between East and West seemed to have gone too far to be reconciled. He had established the root cause as Moscow's belief in inevitable conflict between the Communist and capitalist worlds. He had deplored the Kremlin's adherence to the idea of security in terms of square miles.

I suggested that if Moscow could not be persuaded or mollified, perhaps it could be outwaited. I put the question to Mr. Litvinov in these words: "What are

the chances of postponing conflict between East and West long enough to allow new and younger men, who are not laboring under the obsolete geographical concept of security, to grow up and take over?"

He dismissed the question with a wave of his hand.

"What difference does it make?" he asked.

"What difference does it make if the young men are educated intensively in the precise spirit of the old?"

Plainly, he did not expect any improvement should the Malenkovs, Berias and other fanatics take over.

But if word got around that the Kremlin's policy was driving Russia and the world toward inevitable ruin, might despair not rouse internal opposition? Mr. Litvinov answered that at some length.

Mr. Litvinov recalled that during my days in Germany I had some knowledge of life under a dictatorship.


Nazi Parallel.

"We must not forget," he said, "that the German and Italian people did not revolt even in the face of the most dreadful and hopeless punishment. In 1792 the French people could storm arsenals, grab muskets and make revolution. But today the people would need artillery, tanks, radio stations, printing presses—all of which are held tightly in the hands of any totalitarian state. That is why it would be terribly difficult, for instance, to dislodge . . . Franco."

He paused a bit longer than usual between the last two words, but neither his face nor his voice changed expression.

To illustrate his point further Mr. Litvinov continued:

"Even during the war, in my opinion, the activities of the various underground movements in France and elsewhere have been greatly exaggerated. The only



United Press Photo.

Maxim Litvinov (left) and Secretary of State Cordell Hull during talks that led to U.S. recognition of Soviet Russia in 1933.

place where the Germans were caused any serious inconvenience was in Yugoslavia."

Red Public Opinion.

I should have asked him about the partisans in Russia, but I remember not wanting to do any probing which might bring him up short in this dangerous discussion.

Mr. Litvinov went back to public opinion.

"I often wonder," he declared, "when I read reports of British and American correspondents who say, 'The Russian people think so and so,' what people? Whom do they see? No one.

"On the other hand," he mused, "by following what the propaganda machine puts into men's minds one can judge what any thinking is likely to arrive at."

I thought I might point out that popular revolution against a determined dictatorship is indeed difficult, but what about a coup d'etat inside the ruling clique?

"No," Mr. Litvinov replied, "even for a palace revolution one would need the support of the army and the police."

I began to discuss Germany. Mr. Litvinov declared: "Of all the

single problems in the world today Germany is the greatest.

What would happen there, I probed.

Mr. Litvinov answered readily. This was in June, 1946, when the Western military governors in Germany were still plugging away at four-power co-operation and unification under the Potsdam agreement. Mr. Litvinov had manifestly long since kissed off the "agreement" reached at Potsdam. "Germany will obviously be broken into two parts," he said drily.

Couldn't some other solution be found, I asked, since both sides professed a desire to unify Germany?

Mr. Litvinov again, with matter-of-fact prophesy: "Each side wants a unified Germany—under its control."

What effect would this great power struggle have on the Germans themselves? Could it stir up resistance, or even an underground? Mr. Litvinov was skeptical, but less definite in rejecting this contingency.

"It's possible, of course," he said, "because the oppressors are foreign, and the people could reckon

with the support of the police. What's more, they could probably count on secret help from either side of the occupation."

The Soviet deputy foreign minister could speak with authority for his side at least. Years later I was sorry I had not asked him about Korea.

My interview with Mr. Litvinov lasted nearly an hour. I left his office puzzled and excited.

I half expected to be arrested on the street. Having the story was uncomfortable enough. Writing it was out of the question. The censor would have killed the broadcast and the secret police would have taken care of Mr. Litvinov.

As for myself, Hitler's Gestapo had hooked me on "suspicion of espionage" five years before and disabused me of the notion that nothing could happen to me because I was an American correspondent.

Mystery of Motive.

Next day I went around to the American Embassy and talked it over with John Davies, the brilliant first secretary, with whom I had discussed a line of questioning before I saw Mr. Litvinov. He agreed that publication was too risky. But the material was secretly rushed to Secretary of State Byrnes, who was again wrestling with Foreign Minister Molotov in Paris. It had the effect Mr. Litvinov undoubtedly meant it to have.

During the next few days I braced myself for the news that Mr. Litvinov had died suddenly or been killed in an accident. But he lived long enough to persuade me that either his office had not been wired for sound or that the dictaphone had broken down.

The mystery of why Mr. Litvinov had spoken out in this way to a complete stranger remained. As I left his office his heavy breathing almost turned to sighs as he urged me repeatedly to take his remarks as the individual opinions of a private citizen. At no time, as best I can remember, did he ask me to keep anything off the record.

The mystery was at least partially cleared up two months later.

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TOMORROW: Why Mr. Litvinov Warned the Free World